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One enduring legacy of the Great Depression was the creation of deposit insur- 
ance for financial intermediaries. Deposit insurance was a real innovation in 
federal regulation of  the financial system. While the New Deal's anticompeti- 
tive  barriers have  largely collapsed, deposit insurance has  become  deeply 
rooted.'  Coverage of  the banking system has expanded steadily, and it has 
spread to other financial sectors. Economists have inveighed against govern- 
ment insurance of financial intermediaries' liabilities; and yet even in the wake 
of costly insurance disasters, there is little political interest in altering this pil- 
lar of the New Deal. 
Without the Great Depression, the United States would not have adopted the 
New Deal package of financial regulations that prominently featured deposit 
insurance. The New Deal regulations limiting competition had profound ef- 
fects on the financial system; however, these regulations, with some excep- 
tions, have disappeared while insurance of financial intermediaries appears to 
be permanent. Insurance began with the New Deal's  limited explicit guarantee 
of bank deposits. This protection has grown considerably and is now granted 
implicitly to protect the deposits of all large banks. Furthermore, as table 3.1 
shows, insurance has spread to other financial sectors. Although some features 
of deposit insurance have changed recently, there is no evidence of a rollback. 
With  the important exceptions of  mutual funds and money market mutual 
funds, the insurance of financial institutions' liabilities is pervasive. 
There is no ready model to explain the growth and spread of  federal insur- 
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87 Table 3.1  Spread of Financial Intermediary Insurance (nominal value of insurance per customer) 
Coverage Begun or Increased 
Liability Insured 
and Intermediary  Insurer  Jan 1934  Sept 1934  1950  I966  1969  1970  1974  1980 
Deposits of commercial 
banks and mutual 
savings banks 
Deposits of  savings and 
loan associations 
Shares in credit unions 
Customer accounts held 
by broker-dealers 
Cash 
Cash and securities 
Life insurance policies 
from life insurance 
companies 
Defined-benefit  pensions 
$40,000  $100,000  $2,500  $5,000  $1O,ooO  $15,000  $20,000  FDIC 




$20,000  $40,000  $100,000 
$50,000  $100,000  $500,000 
Established in the 1970s 
PBGC  Established in 1974 
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,  Annual Report (various years), Federal Home Loan Bank Board (various years), National Credit Union Administra- 
tion (various years), Securities Investor Protection Corporation (various years), Brewer and Mondschean (1993), Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (1996). 89  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
ance  of  intermediaries.  Political  economy  offers  models  of  logrolling 
(Schattschneider 1935) and cascading regulation (Hoekman and Leidy 1992; 
Feinberg and Kaplan 1993)  that are not applicable  here. In “logrolling,”  sectors 
of an industry or related industries bargain in Congress for favorable legislation 
combined in one bill. Regulation “cascades” when one industry upstream se- 
cures protection, inducing downstream firms to follow them later and push for 
their own protection. Cascading regulation in international trade moves verti- 
cally from industry to industry. In contrast, the spread of insurance in the fi- 
nancial sector from banks and thrifts to credit unions, broker-dealers, life in- 
surance  companies, and  pension  funds  represents  horizontal  movement. 
Although competition between types of  intermediaries had increased in the 
1920s, New Deal regulations tried to ensure very imperfect competition be- 
tween the various sectors of  the financial industry. Over time, competition 
within each segment and between each type of  intermediary increased. The 
advantages conferred on banks by deposit insurance were then eagerly sought 
by uninsured intermediaries,  and weaker institutions  pushed up the level of in- 
surance. 
In this paper, I examine how insurance spread from one group of institutions 
to the next and how the level of insurance was gradually raised. Although de- 
posit insurance has often been discussed as an important guarantor of the sta- 
bility of  the banking system and hence the economy (Friedman 1959), the 
expansion of deposit insurance cannot be justified on macroeconomic  grounds. 
The general view today is that while the failure of individual banks might begin 
a panic, a systematic collapse may be prevented by proper intervention by the 
Federal Reserve as the lender of  last resort (Friedman and Schwartz 1986). 
Instead, it is its redistributive features that have made insurance a permanent 
feature of the financial system while other New Deal regulations disappeared. 
Redistribution of the costs of failures, hidden in the insurance premiums, has 
gained public acceptance and allowed financial intermediaries to successfully 
lobby for expanded coverage. If insurance was not necessary for securing mac- 
roeconomic stability, substantial costs may have been incurred. I explore the 
cost of  insurance with a counterfactual analysis of an insurance-free post- 
Great Depression financial system in order to assess the burden imposed by 
this legacy of the New Deal. 
3.1  The Origins and Establishment of Deposit Insurance 
While deposit insurance today enjoys broad public support, proposals for 
federal insurance before the Great Depression were viewed as special interest 
legislation. States had experimented with insurance of bank liabilities before 
the Civil War and after the panic of  1907. These state systems had, at best, 
mixed results, establishing a strong policy prejudice against federal insurance 
(Golembe 1960; White 1983; Calomiris 1990;  Wheelock 1992).  Nevertheless, 
a well-motivated lobby of predominantly rural, unit bankers was keen on se- 90  Eugene N. White 
curing a federal guarantee system. Hoping to increase depositor confidence 
while preserving the existing banking structure, these bankers opposed the lib- 
eralization of branching laws and other regulations, which could have produced 
a more stable banking system of  larger, diversified institutions (Calomiris 
1993). 
Studies of the origins of deposit insurance from Golembe (1960) to Calom- 
iris and White (1994) emphasize that deposit insurance would have had little 
chance of  adoption if  the  1930-33  banking collapse had not frightened the 
public into supporting the proinsurance bankers’ cause in Congress. Even so, 
the hurdles faced by backers of deposit insurance were high. From earlier state 
experiments, the problems of  moral hazard and adverse selection were well 
known and debated in Congress (Flood 1991). Aware of  the potential prob- 
lems, the  Roosevelt  administration, the  bank  regulatory agencies, and  the 
larger banks resisted any proposal. In the face of  such opposition, credit for 
the adoption of deposit insurance belongs largely to Rep. Henry Steagall (D- 
Ala.), chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, who refused 
to permit the passage of  any banking legislation unless it included an insur- 
ance system. 
Far from being a high-minded policy aimed at protecting the depositor, the 
design of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was the product 
of  a lengthy legislative struggle, pitting  smaller state-chartered, often unit 
banks against larger banks, often members of  the Federal Reserve System. 
Under the Banking Act of  1933 (often called the Glass-Steagall Act), the Tem- 
porary Deposit Insurance Fund was organized and scheduled to begin opera- 
tions on 1 January 1934. The coverage per depositor was set at a maximum of 
$2,500.2  All Federal Reserve member banks were required to join. Nonmember 
banks could receive insurance only if  they joined the Fed within two years. 
The last provision was resented by nonmember banks because they would be 
forced to meet the higher requirements and stricter regulations imposed on 
members. Banks joining the system were to pay a 0.5 percent assessment of 
insurable deposits, half  upon joining  and half  subject to call (FDIC  1984, 
When the temporary fund was extended for a year in  1934, Steagall at- 
tempted to increase coverage to $10,000 against Roosevelt’s objection that 97 
percent of depositors were already covered. Congress raised the limit to $5,000 
and postponed compulsory Federal Reserve membership until 1 July 1937-a 
victory for the small banks (Bums 1974). The temporary system became per- 
manent under Title I of the Banking Act of  1935, which created the FDIC. All 
Federal Reserve members were still required to join; but in a major concession, 
nonmembers, while subject to approval of the FDIC, were no longer required 
56-57). 
2. A depositor in a bank is provided with insurance up to the legal maximum. Insurance coverage 
is determined by how accounts are legally titled. A husband and wife might each have individual 
accounts and also share a joint account in one bank. All three accounts would be entitled to insur- 
ance up to the maximum because the legal title for each is unique. 91  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
to become members of the Fed. The permanent plan required an annual assess- 
ment on total, not just insured, deposits. This shift was opposed by the larger 
banks, whose shares of uninsured deposits were much greater.3 
The Banking Act of  1935, based largely on the draft legislation of the FDIC 
staff, set a flat annual assessment rate of  one-twelfth, or 0.0833 percent, of a 
bank’s total deposits, eliminating the original capital contribution by banks. To 
ensure that the insurance fund was not depleted, the FDIC was given authority 
to borrow up to $975 million from the Treasury. Banks contributed premiums 
as a fraction of all their deposits but only received protection on deposits up to 
a maximum of $5,000 per account. Small banks and lower-income individuals 
with small deposit accounts benefited, while bigger banks with larger deposi- 
tors provided  a  subsidy. The smaller banks’ competitive position was  im- 
proved, and there was less pressure to build stronger, larger banks. 
The requirement that all Federal Reserve members join the new FDIC guar- 
anteed that the bigger banks, many of whom had opposed federal deposit insur- 
ance, joined  the  system rather than lose the benefits  of  Fed membership. 
Nonmember banks, almost all smaller, state-chartered banks, had pushed for 
deposit insurance. Happy  with  the design, they  signed up  immediately. In 
1935, 91 percent of  the 15,488 commercial banks, with 86 percent of  assets, 
joined the system. Only mutual savings bank membership was low. Of the 566 
mutual savings banks,  11 percent, with  11 percent of  total assets, took out 
membership. Most mutual savings banks preferred to remain in existing state 
insurance systems that offered higher levels of  coverage. Nevertheless, the 
nearly universal coverage of commercial banks and the subsequent disappear- 
ance of bank failures was seen as triumph for the New Deal. 
3.2  The Growth of Deposit Insurance 
For the next 15 years, the FDIC’s insurance of commercial banks and mutual 
savings banks appeared to be an unqualified success. By  1949, commercial 
bank membership crept up to 95 percent, accounting for 49 percent of deposits; 
mutual savings bank membership increased to 36 percent, holding 70 percent 
of  all assets. Bank failures declined, no panics occurred, banks were more 
profitable, and the insurance fund grew. At the same time, inflation had reduced 
the real value of  insurance. World War I1 inflation shrank the real value of 
coverage per depositor from $5,000 in  1934 to $2,807 by  1949. Figure 3.1 
depicts the real value of the maximum coverage offered per depositor from 
1934 to 1995, with the changes in the nominal levels of coverage indicated by 
vertical lines. However, this decline in protection elicited no outcry by deposi- 
tors for more protection. As seen in figure 3.2, the percentage of total deposits 
3. In 1936, the 10,014  banks with deposits of  under $1 million had 85 percent of their deposits 
insured, while the 209 largest banks with deposits over $25 million had only 28 percent of  their 
deposits covered. See table 3.2 below. 92  Eugene N. White 
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Real value of deposit insurance per depositor, 1934-95  Fig. 3.1 
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report (various years) and the consumer 
price index. 
Note:  Changes in nominal coverage are indicated by the vertical lines. 
covered by FDIC  insurance had climbed from 45 percent in 1934 to 50 percent 
in 1950.4  The absence of big failures and the growth of deposits kept the total 
insurance fund at about 1.5 percent of  all insured deposits, as shown in figure 
3.3, in spite of repayment of the initial contributions by Treasury and Federal 
Reserve Banks in 1949 (FDIC  1984,5-7). 
By any measure, the vast majority of “small depositors” were well protected 
by this level of insurance, and there was no public demand for a big increase 
in coverage. In 1949, only 4.4 million of the 104 million bank accounts were 
not fully protected (FDIC,  Annual Report 1949). Some of these accounts were 
government (293,000) and interbank deposits (127,000), which had high aver- 
age balances of  $40,000 and $90,000, in contrast to the average demand de- 
posit balance of  $1,911 and savings and time deposit balance of $824. The 
FDIC (Annual Report  1949) calculated that any increase in coverage would 
offer little additional protection. A rise in coverage to $10,000-which  would 
have returned coverage to its real 1934 value-would  have fully covered an- 
other 3 million accounts, reaching 97 percent of the total. The percentage of 
insured banks’ deposits covered would have risen from 50 percent to 57 per- 
4. The large decline of  coverage in the 1940s, from 45 percent to 35  percent in  1942, was a 
consequence of  the rapid growth of total deposits. Coverage bounced back to 50 percent thanks to 
the account-creating activity of depositors. Between 1941 and 1949, total deposits increased 117 
percent and insured deposits by  174 percent, with the number of fully protected accounts rising 
by 47 percent (FDIC, Annual Report, various years). 70 "'i7 
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Fig. 3.2  Percentage of bank  deposits insured by the FDIC, 1934-94 
Sources: See fig. 3.1. 
Nore: Changes in nominal coverage are indicated by the vertical lines. 
Fig. 3.3  FDIC insurance fund as  a  percentage of insured deposits, 1934-94 
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Fig. 3.4  Insurance of accounts in FDIC banks, 1934-94 
Sources: See fig. 3.1. 
Note: Changes in nominal coverage are indicated by the vertical lines. 
cent. An increase to $25,000 would have covered 99.5 percent of all accounts 
and 65 percent of all deposits. 
Mutual savings banks were a shrinking component of the banking industry 
and played no significant role in the politics of deposit insurance. By  1949, the 
FDIC insured only 192 of the 531 mutual savings banks. Most of the remainder 
(190 of  339) were in Massachusetts and were insured by  a state fund. FDIC- 
insured mutual savings banks had  12.6 million accounts in  1949, with $13 
billion in  deposit^.^ Ninety-four percent of these accounts were fully insured, 
and 61 percent of all deposits were insured. While this profile looks similar to 
that of commercial banks, mutual savings banks were not at the same risk. In 
commercial banks, 68 percent of  all deposits were held in the 3 percent of 
accounts with over $5,000; in mutual savings banks, only 39 percent of  all 
deposits were in the 6 percent of accounts with over $5,000. Very few accounts, 
representing 3.6 percent of deposits, exceeded $10,000, whereas 57.7 percent 
of commercial banks' deposits were in accounts in excess of $10,000. Mutual 
savings banks were not as vulnerable as commercial banks and did not join the 
demand for a rise in insurance. 
Demand for an increase in coverage was driven by the small banks' fear of 
losing deposits. Figure 3.4 shows the drop in fully insured accounts, from 98.5 
5. Non-FDIC-insured  mutual savings banks had $5.7 billion in deposits. 95  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
Table 3.2  Percentage of Insured Commercial Banks by Their Percentage of 
Insured Deposits 
Percentage of Insured Deposits 
Less than  Number of 

















































Sources; FDIC, Annual Report (1951,76; 1955,68; 1964, 102-3). 
percent at the inception of insurance to just under 96 percent by  1949. The 
smallest banks felt this change acutely. Table 3.2 shows that in 1936 35.4 per- 
cent of  banks had 90-100  percent of  their deposits insured. The number of 
banks enjoying this high level of  coverage collapsed to 5.7 percent in 1949. 
The search for protection by large depositors threatened smaller banks. In the 
1950 Senate hearings on deposit insurance, Sydney J. Hughes of the Industrial 
Bank of Commerce of New York City and member of the Consumer Bankers 
Association explained that “when a depositor’s balance exceeds the $5,000 in- 
sured maximum, he shifts the surplus to another bank and becomes one of 
what must be millions of multiple deposits” (U.S. Senate 1950, 90). 
There were good reasons for deposits in excess of the insured maximum to 
worry bankers, as one recent study suggests. Using a special sample of wealthy 
households from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, Kennickell, Kwast, 
and Starr-McCluer (1996) found that while large depositors keep substantial 
shares of their assets in insured depositories, they often fail to keep them within 
insurance limits. According to the survey, a sizable 17.3 percent of household 
deposits were uninsured. Kennickell et al. found that any reduction or restric- 
tion in insurance coverage would substantially increase the uninsured deposits 
of households and increase the likelihood of withdrawak6 
In 1950, bills to raise coverage were introduced by Senators John W.  Bricker 
(R-Ohio), Claude D.  Pepper (D-Fla.), Charles W.  Tobey  (R-N.H.), Hugh A. 
Butler (R-Nebr.), Willian Larger (R-N.D.), and Burnet R. Maybank (D-S.C.), 
who was chairman of the banking committee. All of these bills contained in- 
creases up to $15,000, and Pepper’s would have removed the limit altogether. 
6. Employing a probit model, Kennickell et al. (1996) found that lowering the deposit insurance 
ceiling from $lOO,OOO  to $75,000  would increase total household uninsured deposits by 29 per- 
cent. Smaller effects were found for eliminating separate coverage of existing IRA  and Keogh ac- 
counts. 96  Eugene N. White 
In his plea for a rise to $10,000, Senator Butler noted that “from my correspon- 
dence, I judge that it is primarily the smaller country banks that are anxious 
for this change. It seems that under the present system a good many depositors 
maintain part or all of their funds in the city banks at some distances, perhaps 
from their homes” (US. Senate 1950, 101). Ben Dubois, the secretary of the 
Independent Bankers Association, made an explicit appeal to protect the small 
banks, stating that “the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has been a pow- 
erful instrument in the perpetuation of  independent banking. It has put the 
small bank on a par with the large bank in the eyes of the average depositor” 
(U.S. Senate 1950,87-88). 
Federal regulators supported the increase but tended to cloak their support 
in terms of  the ideology of  guaranteeing continued protection of  the small 
depositor. In the 1950 hearings, there was general support from federal regula- 
tors to raise the ceiling to $10,000. The secretary of the treasury, John W.  Sny- 
der, and the comptroller of  the currency, Preston Delano, favored an increase 
to $10,000. Delano argued that $10,000  was justified on the grounds that prices 
had risen, lowering effective coverage, even though he admitted that $5,000 
still covered 96 percent of accounts. The chairman of the FDIC, Maple T. Harl, 
also supported the increase on the grounds that protection of the small deposi- 
tor required it; but he was  also clear that “the preservation of the American 
banking system. . . .  As you  very well know, the survival of the dual banking 
system in large measure depends on Federal deposit insurance” (U.S. Senate 
1950, 22-23).  Former FDIC chairman Leo Crowley testified that he favored 
the increase from $5,000 to $10,000 because it would help small savers and 
the small banks in their home communities. 
Larger banks were generally willing to  support a rise, but they were less 
enthusiastic and were more concerned about the fact they subsidized the sys- 
tem. American Bankers Association officials testified in favor of $10,000 cov- 
erage but warned that any further increase would endanger the system (U.S. 
Senate 1950, 66). Frederick A. Potts, president of Philadelphia National Bank 
and a representative of the Reserve Bankers Association, testified that limited 
deposit insurance was a sound idea. He warned, however, that a rise in protec- 
tion to $10,000 would undermine good bank management and stimulate de- 
mands for more coverage (U.S. Senate 1950, 80-81).  The most striking testi- 
mony against the proposal came from one of the founding fathers of the FDIC, 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg. In  a letter, he denounced the proposed rise to 
$10,000 coverage, arguing that it was imprudent: “There is no general public 
demand for this increased coverage. It is chiefly requested by banker demand 
in some quarters for increased competitive advantage in bidding for deposits.” 
He predicted that “if  we extend the coverage to $10,000, how long will it be 
before we confront demands for total coverage? Total coverage would virtually 
socialize our private banking system. It could involve many of the vices which 
so often wrecked previous well-meaning adventures in this field” (U.S. Senate 
1950, 50-5  1). 97  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
The willingness of larger banks to support an increase in the level of cover- 
age did not arise from any hope to improve their competitive position by insur- 
ing more deposits. Their position changed very  little in  terms of  insurance 
coverage after the 1950 act went into effect. At the very beginning, in  1936, 
large banks received very little protection, as seen in table 3.3. While the more 
than 10,000 banks with under $1 million in deposits had 86 percent of their 
deposits insured and the banks with $1-$5  million in deposits had 74 percent 
of  their deposits protected by  the FDIC, the 200 largest banks had only 28 
percent of their deposits insured. Coverage for them grew; yet by  1949, cover- 
age was still only 36 percent. What concerned the larger banks was not the fact 
that they still had large uninsured deposits but that they were assessed on their 
total, not just their insured, deposits. To cover a much larger fraction of their 
deposits would have required a huge increase in coverage that would have in- 
terested few smaller banks. 
Furthermore, a big increase in coverage would have decreased the ratio of 
the insurance fund to insured deposits, depicted in figure 3.3, perhaps requiring 
an increase in assessments. The insurance fund had grown thanks to the virtual 
disappearance of bank failures. The fund easily repaid the initial contributions 
($289 million) of  the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks (FDIC 1984, 
58-60). There was concern that the assessment rate was too high, not too low, 
cutting into bank profits. Although banks’ net earnings rose steadily during the 
1940s, net profits had declined from $906 million in 1945 to $831 million in 
1949. At the same time, the FDIC assessment climbed from $86 million to 
$109 million, following the rise in total deposits (FDIC, Annual Report  1949, 
40). Cutting the assessment could easily buoy profits. 
Not surprisingly, the larger banks lobbied Congress for a reduction in assess- 
ments while they grumbled about the increase in coverage. The smaller banks 
returned the favor. The Independent Bankers Association was set against any 
reduction in the premium and protested that big banks had no right to complain 
as they  had obtained the interest prohibition on demand deposits under the 
New Deal. The end result was a compromise: an increase in coverage and a 
change in assessment that satisfied both parties and ensured swift passage of 
the 1950 act. Figure 3.2 shows that the new level of $10,000 coverage protected 
an additional 5 percent of deposits. More important for banks concerned about 
protection, the shares of fully protected accounts, shown in table 3.2, returned 
to their earlier level. The more exposed banks that had fallen from their high 
level, 90-100  percent, of protected deposits, regained ground lost in the previ- 
ous decade. 
The larger banks also benefited. The basic assessment rate was not reduced 
because the FDIC feared this might set the stage for a depletion of the fund. 
Instead, it was lowered by a rebate system. The FDIC deducted operating ex- 
penses and insurance losses from gross assessment income then shared the 
remainder, returning 60 percent to the banks and keeping 40 percent. As seen 
in figure 3.5, this rule produced some fluctuation in the assessment rate around Table 3.3  Insurance Coverage by Size of Bank 
Under $1 million  $1-$5  million  $5-$25  million  Over $25 million  Over $100 million  Over $1 billion 
1936 
Number of banks 
Deposits insured (%) 
Accounts insured (%) 
Number of banks 
Deposits insured (%) 
Accounts insured (%) 
Number of banks 
Deposits insured (%) 
Accounts insured (%) 
Number of banks 
Deposits insured (%) 
Accounts insured (%) 
Number of banks 
Deposits insured (%) 
Accounts insured (%) 
Number of banks 
Deposits insured (%) 
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Sources: FDIC, Annual Reports (various years) and Report of  Deposits (various years). 100  Eugene N. White 
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Fig. 3.5  FDIC effective assessment rate, 1934-94 
Sources: See fig. 3.1. 
0.035 and 0.037 percent of total deposits, far below the original 0.0833 per- 
cent. Total assessments in  1951 reached $124 million, but $70 million was 
rebated to the banks (FDIC, Annual Report 1951). Net profits for 1951 were 
$908 million, but they would have stood at only $838 million without this 
change. 
The 1950 act was a well-crafted compromise. Insurance coverage of all de- 
posits was on the rise. Larger banks, which had initially opposed deposit insur- 
ance, now “signed on” to support insurance thanks to the reduction in the ef- 
fective assessment rate. The 1950 increase in insurance coverage was the last 
time that commercial banks appear to have been the primary movers behind 
insurance legislation. While commercial and mutual savings banks covered by 
the FDIC saw nominal coverage rise and the percentage of funds insured in- 
crease, greater competition and inflation put more pressure on other financial 
intermediaries who clamored more loudly for higher coverage. 
3.3  Evaluating the Rise in Coverage for Commercial Banks 
Legislation raising the level of  coverage is only one factor leading to a 
higher level of  protection. To  explain the growing percentage of  deposits in 
FDIC-insured institutions that were covered by FDIC insurance, shown in fig- 
ure 3.2, four factors were considered: (1) If the real maximum deposit insur- 
ance coverage per depositor is increased, the percentage of  covered deposits 
should rise. (2) Failures, measured either as the number of failing banks or the 101  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
percentage of deposits in failing banks, might induce depositors to shift their 
uninsured deposits to new  accounts or banks for complete coverage. (3) A 
rapid  growth  in  deposits might decrease coverage if  individuals’ balances 
quickly rise above insured levels. (4) If individuals open new accounts to en- 
sure coverage of their deposits, the increase in the number of accounts should 
raise the percentage of deposits covered.’ 
Data on the number of accounts were difficult to obtain, as this information 
was only collected by the FDIC in occasional special reports until 1981. This 
is displayed in table 3.4. Beginning in 1990, some data on commercial banks’ 
accounts were collected by  the FDIC.*  Accounts of  all banks appear to have 
grown at a very rapid rate between 1934 and the mid-1970s. The average rate 
of growth exceeded the real rate of growth of the economy. Starting in the late 
1970s and certainly in the early 1980s, this growth slows down, with some 
years of  decline. The stagnation between 1981 and 1990 may be attributable 
to the high level of coverage provided by the jump from $40,000 to $100,000 
insurance and the increase in alternatives to bank deposits, such as money mar- 
ket mutual funds. A continuous time series of accounts for the period 1934-81 
was  constructed by  regressing the number of  accounts on time  and time- 
squared to fill in the missing observations, but no attempt was made to fill the 
gap between 1981 and 1990 when the trend growth abruptly changed. 
Unit root tests and an examination of the partial autocorrelations indicated 
that the percentage of insured deposits, the real insurance per depositor, and 
the  measures of  bank  failures needed  first-differencing for  stationarity. It 
was  difficult to judge  whether the  growth of  deposits also required  first- 
differencing, but the results were similar so only the first-differenced results 
were reported in table 3.5. Regressions (1) and (2) are for the whole period, 
1934-94,  and exclude the variable for accounts. As hypothesized, an increase 
in the real value of maximum deposit insurance coverage per depositor raises 
the percentage of covered deposits. A rise in real coverage of $10,000 would 
drive the percentage of insured deposits up by about 6 percent, suggesting that 
this factor alone can only account for a modest portion of the increase. Also, 
as conjectured, an increase in deposits tends to lower the percentage of covered 
deposits. An acceleration in deposit growth of 1 percent pushed down coverage 
approximately 1.7 percent. The most notable example of this effect was during 
World War 11,  when the rapid growth of deposits outweighed other influences 
and temporarily halted the upward trend in coverage. Neither variable for bank 
failures helps to explain the rising coverage of deposits, probably because there 
is little variation in failures. For depositors, it may have been a minor consider- 
ation given the FDIC’s practice of frequently providing full insurance to depos- 
itors whose accounts were over the limit (FDIC 1984). 
7.  The data were obtained from the FDIC’s annual reports. The consumer price index was used 
8. The  1990-96 data were obtained through the FDIC’s website (R. Drozdowski, correspon- 
to obtain the real value of deposit insurance. 
dence with author, rodrozdowski @fdic.gov). Table 3.4  Number, Growth, and Insurance of Bank Accounts, 1934-96 
All Insured Banks  All Commercial Banks 
All Accounts  Fully Insured Accounts  All Accounts  Fully Insured Accounts 
Annual  Annual  Percentage of  Annual  Annual  Percentage of 
Number  Growth  Number  Growth  Accounts Fully  Number  Growth  Number  Growth  Accounts Fully 
(millions)  Rate (%)  (millions)  Rate (%)  Insured (3)/(1)  (millions)  Rate (%)  (millions)  Rate (%)  Insured (8)/(6) 
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0.3  287.5  99.2 
-0.7  283.6  -0.7  99.2 
0.2  284.7  0.2  99.2 
2.9  301.3  2.9  99.2 
0.4  303.5  0.4  99.1 
Sources: 1934-8 1,  FDIC, Annual Reports (various years) and Reporrs ofDeposits (various years); 1990-96, R. Drozdowski, correspondence with author, rodrozdowski 
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Table 3.5  Determinants of FDIC Insurance Coverage of Commercial 
Bank Deposits 
1934-94  1934-81 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
lntercept  0.48  1  0.486  0.338  0.44 I 
(2.06)  (2.10)  (0.44)  (0.57) 
Real value of  insurance  0.566  0.571  0.598  0.602 
per depositor  (3.51)  (3.59)  (3.371)  (3.38) 
Percentage of deposits  0.188  -346.486 
in failing banks  (0.00)  (-0.87) 
banks  (1.12)  (0.67) 
Growth in bank  -16.518  -  16.507  -  16.046  -  16.087 
Number of failing  0.014  0.020 
deposits  (-4.01)  (-4.06)  (-3.53)  (-3.53) 
bank accounts  (0.14)  (-0.02) 
Growth in number of  0.016  -0.029 
Adjusted R’  0.302  0.3 18  0.380  0.315 
F-statistic  9.381  10.013  6.300  6.175 
Durbin-  Watson statistic  2.119  2.138  2.134  2.178 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The constructed time series on number of accounts was used in regressions 
(3) and (4) for the years 1934-81. The variable does not help explain the behav- 
ior of the dependent variable. However, this should not be taken as evidence 
that account-creating activity of depositors had no effect on coverage. The cor- 
relation between the number of accounts and the percentage of covered depos- 
its from 1934 to 1981 is high, 0.93, reflecting a common trend. In the regres- 
sion, the percentage of insured deposits is first-differenced, but the application 
of this procedure to accounts is first-differencing a variable, many of  whose 
observations are fitted to the trend, thus rendering it relatively weak in the 
regression. While the quality of  the data on  accounts does not permit very 
robust tests of the effects of  individual account-creating activity, qualitative 
evidence implicates account creation as an important factor from the beginning 
of the FDIC until at least the mid-1970s. 
Although account creation may have been more important, the regressions 
only identify the FDIC’s increased coverage per account in 1950, 1966, 1969, 
1974, and 1980 as a key factor. The first increase in real coverage in 1950 was 
the product of lobbying by unhappy sectors of commercial banking. Afterward, 
it was not commercial banks but rather their rivals that pushed for expanded 
coverage. 
3.4  Raising Deposit Insurance in 1966 and 1969: The Role of the S&Ls 
Savings and loan associations (S&Ls) originally had little interest in deposit 
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and probably would never have  supported one if  commercial banks had not 
obtained the FDIC (Ewalt 1962). S&Ls were given the opportunity to obtain 
federal deposit insurance at the same time as Congress established the FDIC. 
The National Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), almost as an afterthought, to provide a full set 
of institutions to S&Ls to parallel those for banks9  Many thrifts had found it 
advantageous to join the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System. The pur- 
chase of shares in one of the 12 regional Federal Home Loan Banks gave them 
access to FHLB credit facilities but did not impose any additional regulations 
on them (Grossman 1992). Many fewer took out charters to become federal 
mutual savings and loan associations. Supervised by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (FHLBB) and narrowly constrained in lending, a federal charter 
appeared relatively unattractive to most S&Ls. Although federally chartered 
S&Ls were required to join the FSLIC, members of  the FHLB system were 
not so obliged. This regulation contrasted with insurance provisions for banks, 
under which all Federal Reserve members-national  banks and state banks- 
were required to obtain FDIC insurance. Thus, by  1940, half of all S&Ls had 
joined a Federal Home Loan Bank, but only 20 percent took out federal char- 
ters. Unlike the banks, for which deposit insurance was almost universal from 
the outset, only 30 percent of the S&Ls, with 50 percent of assets (see fig. 3.6), 
had obtained FSLIC insurance by  1940. 
The initial responses of banks and S&Ls to deposit insurance reflected their 
different experiences during the Great Depression and the costs and benefits of 
insurance they faced. Both industries suffered severe withdrawals of deposits 
between 1929 and 1933. Commercial banks lost 17 percent of their deposits 
and S&Ls 28 percent. S&Ls were forced to endure a larger contraction, but it 
was more orderly. Between 1929 and the end of  1933, the number of banks 
fell from 24,504 to 14,440; yet the number of S&Ls only declined from 12,342 
to  10,596. Unlike the banks, which had to wait for state and then federal bank 
holidays to refuse customers payment, the S&Ls had the right to put depositors 
“on notice” and refuse to meet demands for withdrawals until loan repayments 
came in. Thus, S&Ls had a device to ward off the runs that devastated banks 
and saw less advantage to insurance that required acceptance of more federal 
regulation. In addition, FSLIC insurance came at a higher price. The FSLIC 
premium was 0.125 percent of deposits, whereas FDIC insurance was 0.0833 
percent. The FSLIC rate was only reduced to the FDIC level in 195  1 (Gross- 
man 1992). 
After World War  11,  the thrifts were one of  the fastest growing groups of 
financial intermediaries. The New  Deal conferred a variety of advantages on 
thrifts, whose share of all financial intermediaries assets rose from 6 percent 
9. In 1932, Congress passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, which created the Federal Home 
Loan Banks and Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which paralleled the Federal Reserve System. 
The Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 gave the board authority to charter a new class of intermedi- 
ary, federal mutual S&Ls, thus creating for the thrift industry a dual federal-state regulatory system 
that paralleled the dual banking system. 106  Eugene N. White 
-  All S&Ls  ---- Assets of  all S&Ls 
Fig. 3.6  Membership in the FSLIC, 1935-73 
Sources: Federal Home Loan Bank  Board (various years). 
in 1950 to 13 percent in  1970. Although imperfect substitutes for commercial 
banks’ demand deposits, which paid no interest, S&L interest-bearing pass- 
books were attractive to small savers and competed with banks’ time deposits. 
By  1950, 50 percent of  S&Ls, with 80 percent of  all assets, had joined the 
system (see fig. 3.6). However, unlike banks, FSLIC-insured institutions had 
almost all their accounts insured. In  1941, 86 percent of  all savings capital 
(deposits) in S&Ls were insured, rising to 94 percent by  1947. This high level 
of insurance is attributable to the predominance of  small savers with balances 
averaging well below $1,000 (FHLBB 1947). This nearly complete coverage 
helps to explain why the insured S&Ls did not participate in the 1950 deposit 
insurance debate. Ten years later, conditions had changed dramatically. When 
the flow of  savings deposits surging into S&Ls came to an abrupt halt in the 
credit crunch of  1966, S&Ls became interested in deposit insurance. The simi- 
larity of coverage among thrifts assured a fairly uniform view of the desirabil- 
ity  of  increased insurance in  contrast to  the  wide  divergence of  opinion 
among banks. 
Neither banks nor S&Ls saw the erosion in the real value of deposit insur- 
ance per depositor as a threat. The decline in real deposit insurance shown in 
figure 3.1 was  slight compared to what happened before the 1950 increase. 
Furthermore, total coverage of deposits, shown in figure 3.2, was fairly stable. 
However, there was a significant drop in the number of fully insured accounts 
that especially affected small banks. Although coverage dropped for most 107  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
classes of banks, the three smallest categories of banks in table 3.3  show very 
large declines in coverage of deposits between 1951 and 1966. Inflation and 
the shift between groups make comparisons between years difficult, yet  the 
danger posed by this decline in coverage is clear in table 3.2. Here, the percent- 
age of commercial banks with 90-100  percent of their deposits insured by the 
FDIC dropped from 23.2 percent in 195 1 to 9.9 percent in 1964. Thus, a small 
but significant fraction of  the banking industry was feeling increasingly ex- 
posed. 
By the mid-1960s, banks and thrifts were also worried that interest rate re- 
strictions reduced their ability to attract deposits. While banks had been subject 
to Regulation Q interest rate ceilings since 1935, FHLB member thrifts were 
constrained by FHLBB rules, which imposed a variety of restrictions on the 
“dividends” paid on savings account (FHLBB 1965). In 1965, the limit on the 
interest charged on banks’ time deposits stood at 5.5  percent, yet  very few 
S&Ls could offer rates in excess of 5 percent. In this year, market rates moved 
above the ceilings, and both banks and thrifts began to lose funds.I0 Thrifts 
experienced a 4 percent fall in funds available for new investment, followed 
by  a 28 percent fall in 1966, when savings inflows and loan repayments fell 
off. The big demand for advances from the FHLBB, led the board to ration 
lending to S&Ls, which then slashed mortgage lending by  one-third. In re- 
sponse, the board adopted a more flexible dividend policy; and by  the end of 
1966, over 20 percent of  S&L deposits were paying 5.25  percent (FHLBB 
1966). 
Interest rate regulations needed some unification to preserve the system. The 
Treasury and the FDIC proposed that the FHLBB be given more supervisory 
authority and power to set maximum interest and dividend rates. Many S&Ls 
were not enthusiastic about the prospect of new FHLBB regulation, but they 
were willing to countenance more control if it would ensure that deposit in- 
flows resumed. Of  considerable concern to the S&Ls was that savers were 
showing great reluctance to hold deposits in excess of  the $10,000  level of 
coverage. One board study showed that there was an “artificial bulge” in the 
number of S&L accounts at the $10,000 level, indicating that people were lim- 
iting their deposits (Congressional Record 1966, 112, pt. 15: 2035 1-52). 
Efforts to raise insurance predated the 1966 credit crunch, but demands had 
become more urgent. Hearings in Congress were held in  1963 to consider a 
rise in insurance coverage to $25,000 for banks and S&Ls. Over the next three 
years,  congressmen wrangled over the  level of  coverage  and whether the 
FHLBB  should be  granted additional regulatory powers.  In  congressional 
hearings, there was no protest by  the FHLBB, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, or the FDIC about the increase in insurance. They were much 
more concerned about the effects of  changing supervisory practices. Rep. 
10. Some aggressive thrifts employed brokers to advertise and collect funds for them (Marvel1 
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Wright Patman (D-Tex.), chairman of the House Banking and Currency Com- 
mittee, vigorously argued for a simple increase in coverage. He brushed aside 
arguments that individuals could easily secure coverage by  creating multiple 
accounts and claimed that the current $10,000 maximum coverage encouraged 
everyone from businessmen to widows to firemens' funds to put their money 
in out-of-town banks once the ceiling was reached in  local banks. Patman 
slammed the big banks for pressuring their correspondent banks to block an 
increase in insurance, portraying them as predators anxious to drive the S&Ls 
out of business (Congressional Record 1966, 112, pt. 13:20354). 
Congress navigated through these complex, competing interests in writing 
the Interest Rate Control Act of 1966. The act extended Regulation Q to thrifts 
but gave them a favorable differential. Thrifts were allowed to pay  3/4 of  1 
percent in interest more than banks, in the hope of  channeling funds back to 
the mortgage market. Congress also gave more supervisory authority to the 
FHLBB. The legislators settled on increasing deposit insurance for persons 
holding accounts in banks and thrifts to $15,000, a relatively low number as 
far as many thrifts were concerned. Following the 1950 deal, the 1966 package 
provided a sweetener for the larger banks in the form of  an increase in the 
assessment rebate to 66 2/3 percent. Although interest rate  flexibility was 
clearly of greatest concern to intermediaries, the rise in insurance did help. No 
data exist on insurance coverage among thrifts, but the level of insured deposits 
rose for all sizes of banks in table 3.3. 
These adjustments to the New Deal system did little to alleviate the underly- 
ing problems. Once again in 1969-70, tighter monetary policy pushed market 
rates above the Regulation Q ceilings. S&Ls saw virtually no net inflow of new 
funds, while commercial banks lost funds, in contrast to the 1966 experience 
when S&Ls were in greater distress. S&Ls were in better shape thanks to the 
favorable differential in interest rate ceilings. Still, there were gaps in the inter- 
est rate controls. A substantial number of mutual savings banks in the North- 
east that were not members of  the Federal Reserve or the FDIC avoided the 
controls, as did non-FSLIC-member thrifts. These institutions' higher rates 
were drawing funds away. Congress responded to the complaints of controlled 
banks and thrifts by extending Federal authorities' control of all institutions in 
states where over 20 percent of savings were held by non-federally  regulated 
institutions (FHLBB 1969). 
With no debate, Congress also raised deposit insurance coverage for banks 
and thrifts on 23 December 1969, from $15,000 to $20,000.'' This hike halted 
the new decline in fully insured accounts depicted in figure 3.4. The real value 
of coverage was now higher than it had ever been (fig. 3.1), reaching approxi- 
11. Initially, the FDIC and FSLIC relied on state laws to define what constituted  different deposit 
ownership, allowing people in some states to set up multiple accounts within banks and attain 
coverage many times the limit intended for individuals. In  1968, the FDIC and FSLIC joined 
together to produce a consistent set of rules on how to treat multiple accounts, placing some limits 
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mately $7,000 in 1934 dollars. The percentage of insured accounts and depos- 
its of  FDIC institutions were at all-time highs of 99.1 and 63.1 percent (fig. 
3.2), with institutions of all sizes (table 3.3) benefiting from the increase. By 
1969 there were only 208 noninsured commercial banks and nondeposit trust 
companies and 166 noninsured mutual savings banks, virtually all of the latter 
being located in Massachusetts and covered by  its deposit insurance system. 
(FDIC, Annual  Report  1969). In the  thrift industry, over 70 percent of  the 
S&Ls, with over 90 percent of assets, were covered by 1969. Deposit insurance 
coverage in the 1960s had grown considerably for banks and thrifts, well be- 
yond the initial intentions of the New Deal. 
3.5  The Spread of Insurance 
Greater interest rate volatility and increased competition in the 1960s cre- 
ated difficulties for all financial intermediaries. Facing these new challenges, 
credit unions, broker-dealers, pension funds, and insurance companies sought 
the benefits of government-provided insurance for their liabilities. As they held 
relatively modest or no funds on deposit and no claim could be made that 
insurance would serve to prevent a panic, the history of  these intermediaries 
demonstrates how, even in the absence of concern about macroeconomic insta- 
bility, new classes of intermediaries were successful in lobbying Congress to 
expand insurance far beyond its New Deal boundaries. 
Designed to assist the small saver, credit unions grew rapidly in the postwar 
period. The Federal Credit Union Act of  1934 made federal credit union char- 
ters available, as an alternative to state charters, and they soon dominated the 
industry. The number of all credit unions-federal  and state-more  than dou- 
bled from 10,571 in 1950 to 23,656 in 1970, with deposits climbing from $880 
million to $15.5 billion.I2  Like the S&Ls, credit unions were initially reluctant 
to press Congress to create institutions for them. But competition from feder- 
ally assisted and protected banks and thrifts coupled with increased financial 
difficulties led the credit unions to aspire to parity with banks and thrifts. Be- 
tween 1934 and 1969, over 5,600 federal credit unions were 1iq~idated.l~  Fail- 
ures were increasing, and in 1969, 274 federal credit unions were closed, 35 
of them at a total loss of $95,000 to their members. Some assistance for failing 
firms came from  credit union  leagues, which  bailed  out  280  other credit 
unions; but these private reserve funds were very small. Failures induced Mas- 
sachusetts in 1961, and later Wisconsin and Rhode Island, to create state funds; 
but they were restricted to state-chartered credit unions, a small fraction of the 
industry (Congressional Record 1970, 116, pt. 23:30734-47). 
Prompted by the credit crunches of  1966 and 1969, credit unions pressed 
12. However, they were small by comparison with the 5,669 S&Ls, which held $146 billion in 
13. Adequate data exist only for federally regulated credit unions. 
deposits, and the 14,187 banks, which held $505 billion in deposits in 1970. 110  Eugene N. White 
for  lending and  insurance institutions to parallel the Federal Reserve, the 
FHLB system, the FDIC, and the FSLIC. In 1970, Congress obliged them with 
the Federal Credit Union Act, creating the National Credit Union Administra- 
tion (NCUA), an analogue to the Federal Reserve and FHLBB. While this bill 
was making its way  through Congress, an amendment was made to create a 
system of  insurance for credit unions.I4 The amendment was initially spon- 
sored by  several senators, and there was no apparent opposition from either 
banks or thrifts. A simple rationale was given by one sponsor, Sen. Wallace F. 
Bennett (R-Utah), who pointed out that federally chartered credit unions were 
the only depository institutions not covered by  a federal insurance program. 
Bennett admitted that the absence of insurance posed no threat to the stability 
of  the financial system and that the losses of  credit unions had been small. 
Insurance coverage for credit unions was almost a matter of pure competitive 
equity. 
Established in  1970, the  National  Credit Union  Share Insurance Fund 
(NCUSIF) gave the credit unions an insurance system. At the same coverage 
per depositor of $20,000 as the FDIC and the FSLIC, 22 million credit union 
members, who had an average of  $650 on deposit, gained ample protection. 
Like the FDIC and the FSLIC, the NCUSIF was mandatory for federally char- 
tered credit unions and optional for state institutions. Administered by  the 
NCUA, the fund charged an annual premium of  0.0833 on the aggregate of 
members’ accounts and creditor obligations. Adoption of federal insurance was 
not initially universal. Many state-chartered credit unions did not want to ac- 
cept the federal regulations necessary to obtain NCUSIF insurance. At the be- 
hest of  these institutions, more states created their own insurance funds. In 
198  1,  when California established the California Credit Union Share Guaranty 
Corporation, there were 16 state funds, covering 3,150 credit unions with $12 
billion in deposits (NCUA 1982). However, in the wake of widespread failures 
of  banks, S&Ls, and  credit unions in the  1980s, there was  a flight to the 
NCUSIF, which afforded greater protection. In 198 1,  NCUSIF-insured credit 
unions held 82 percent of all credit union shares. By  1985 this figure jumped 
to 92 percent, rising to a nearly universal 99 percent in 1995 with the demise 
of the state insurance plans (NCUA 1989, 1995). 
In the same year that credit unions secured federal protection for their de- 
positors, customers of  broker-dealers received guarantees for their funds on 
deposit-protection  that the original New Deal had never countenanced. The 
Securities Exchange Act of  1934 tried to protect customers from brokers’ dis- 
honesty but not their incompetence. Protection from incompetence was the 
responsibility of  the  relevant  self-regulatory organization-the  New  York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the National Association of  Securities Dealers 
(NASD). These organizations could intervene and transfer customer accounts 
14. The legislation enjoyed wide support among credit unions: when the Credit Union National 
Association surveyed its membership, 92 percent supported the bill. 111  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
from a weak to a strong member firm, liquidate failing members, or merge 
weak firms with stronger ones (Teweles and Bradley 1987). 
The rising volume of activity on the exchanges during the 1960s bull market 
put an enormous strain on brokerages’ ability to handle the complex paperwork 
that accompanied every transaction. The number of “fails” or failures to deliver 
security certificates or complete transactions produced a “back office” crisis. 
Many firms were swamped by business and could not manage their operations 
well. Firms used customers’ free credit balances for any business purpose, in- 
cluding trading or underwriting, putting these funds on deposit at risk. When 
Ira Haupt and Company failed in 1963, as a result of a huge default on com- 
modity contracts, the NYSE stepped in and assisted with the firm’s liquidation 
(Teweles and Bradley 1987). Anticipating more problems, the NYSE created 
a special trust fund of $10 million and a $15 million line of credit in 1964 to 
assist troubled members and protect customers (Sowards and Mofslcy  1971). 
The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) followed the NYSE’s lead, and by 
1968 all the exchanges had established special funds (Sobel 1972; U.S. Sen- 
ate 1970). 
When the bull market broke in 1969 and prices and volume fell, many bro- 
kerages held large inventories. Falling revenues and costly inventory losses led 
129 NYSE member firms to be liquidated, merged, or acquired, and another 
70 required some assistance from the exchange. The special fund ran out of 
funds in the summer of 1970 and was unable to pay out customers’ accounts 
in failed brokerages. In this emergency, the NYSE transferred $30 million 
from its building fund to its special fund. However, it was clear that if a large 
brokerage went uhder, the resources of the special fund would be inadequate 
(Sobel 1975). The free credit balances-in  effect, the funds customers held on 
deposit with broker-dealer firms-stood  at $3 billion in 1970 for NYSE mem- 
ber firms. In addition, broker-dealers had custody of $50 billion in customer 
securities (US. Senate 1970). Although there were no runs on brokerages, the 
exchanges appeared unable to provide sufficient protection on their own. Insur- 
ance, equivalent to FDIC and the FSLIC, was viewed as a reasonable solution 
by  the securities industry and the public (Seligman 1982). The House report 
on insurance legislation was explicit: “Failures may lead to loss of customers’ 
funds and securities with an inevitable weakening of  confidence in the U.S. 
securities markets. Such lessened confidence has an effect on the entire econ- 
omy. . . . The need is similar in many respects to that which prompted the es- 
tablishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Sav- 
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation” (US  House 1970, 2). This misreading 
of  history identified macroeconomic stability as the prime reason for insur- 
ance, when special interests in the financial industry always had the keenest 
interest in the establishment of insurance funds. 
A proposal was put before Congress to establish a Securities Investor Protec- 
tion Corporation (SIPC) to act as an FDIC or FSLIC for the securities industry. 
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the Department of the Treasury, and Congress’ Joint Securities Industry Task 
Force. An old New Dealer, Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) questioned the intention 
of insuring all firms registered with the SEC without any inspection or further 
regulation. These qualms were repeated by other congressmen; but like the bill 
for credit unions, the idea of insuring customer accounts had wide support in 
Congress (Congressional Record 1970, 116, pt. 29:39345-70). 
Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) in December 
1970. This act created the SIPC, which was charged to administer a fund pro- 
viding protection up to a maximum of $50,000 for both cash and securities, 
with a limit of  $20,000 for cash. This insurance was mandatory for broker- 
dealers registered with the SEC, making coverage nearly universal from the 
outset. All SIPC members were assessed 3/16 of  1 percent per year of  gross 
revenues from the securities business for the SIPC fund (Matthews 1994). If 
needed, the corporation could borrow up to $1 billion from the U.S. Treasury 
with the approval of  the SEC (Seligman 1982).15 Under SEC oversight, the 
SIPC has no authority to examine or inspect its members. Instead, the securi- 
ties exchanges and the NASD are the examining authorities for their members, 
and the SIPA gave the SEC additional authority to adopt rules relating to the 
acceptance, custody, and use of customers’ securities, deposits, and credit bal- 
ances.  l6 
The examples of insurance for credit unions and broker-dealers reflect the 
low tolerance for even small losses to the customers of financial intermediaries 
and the drive for equal competitive advantage. Although concern about the 
effects of failures on the stability of the financial system was often discussed, 
it motivated few participants in the legislative process. The spread of insurance 
to nondepository intermediaries, where a financial panic or run is not a con- 
cern, highlights this fact. Both pension funds and insurance companies re- 
sponded to the favorable political circumstances to demand insurance. Un- 
derfunding  of  private  defined-benefit pension  plans  left  workers  without 
pensions when their employers went bankrupt. The Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) was established by Title IV of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act  in  1974 to protect retirement incomes from defined- 
benefit pension plans. Financed by  premiums collected from companies, the 
PBGC’s coverage of pensions reached over one-third of the workforce by 1995 
(PBGC 1995). While insurance of pensions became a federal responsibility, 
the guarantee of life insurance became a state responsibility as the federal gov- 
ernment had never ventured to regulate life insurance. Before 1970, only New 
York had a guarantee system to protect policyholders. A rise in failures of life 
15. Some brokerage firms carry additional commercial insurance on accounts exceeding SIPC 
coverage. 
16. Before this act, there were no SEC or exchange rules regarding the use of customers’ credit 
balances or other balances in possession of broker-dealers.  After 1973, the SEC limited the use of 
customers’ funds to finance margin loans to other customers and other customer-related activities 
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insurance companies prompted the National Association of  Insurance Com- 
missioners to recommend a model guarantee system to state legislatures in 
1970.  Although the plans vary from state to state, funds guarantee insurance in 
all 50 states (Brewer and Mondschean 1993). 
By  the early 1970s, financial pressures had pushed the insurance of liabili- 
ties beyond the banking system to the securities, pension, and insurance indus- 
tries. There was no anticipation that the FDIC, FSLIC, NCUSIF, SIPC, PBGC, 
or state insurance systems could fall into trouble. In fact, the spread of insur- 
ance helped to prompt new  demands from depositories for increased pro- 
tection. 
3.6  The 1974 Increase in Insurance 
In  1973, Fernand St. Germain (D-R.I.) offered a bill to increase deposit in- 
surance from $20,000 to $50,000 and provide 100 percent insurance for all 
government deposits, amending the FDIC act, the National Housing Act, and 
the Federal Credit Union Act. Where did this demand for more protection 
come from? Once again, there was no cry by the public for increased protec- 
tion. As seen in figure 3.1, inflation had reduced the real value of  insurance 
after the  1969 increase, but a $50,000 increase would have been a huge in- 
crease in real coverage. Total FDIC coverage of  deposits in  figure 3.2 had 
sagged a bit, but it was slight for all sizes of banks in table 3.3. 
The interest group at work behind this new proposal was the thrift industry, 
although some banks also were eager for higher levels of coverage. An appeal 
was made to raise coverage to $50,000 to achieve parity with the securities 
industry-even  though brokerage accounts only had insurance of $20,000 for 
cash. Frank Willie, chairman of the FDIC, took the view of the small banks in 
testifying that more insurance was required because “depositors seem to be- 
lieve that their money is safest in the largest institutions. . . . A depositor is 
more likely to put funds exceeding the insured limit in a large commercial 
bank than a small one” (U.S. House 1973, 14). In addition, he pointed out that 
more insurance would reduce the flight of funds from depository institutions 
to nondeposit institutions and markets. 
The thrifts appeared to be especially eager to attract state and local deposits 
and  were relentless in their congressional testimony about the need for 100 
percent insurance of government deposits (U.S. House 1973). The representa- 
tive of the U.S. Savings and Loan League described the cumbersome process 
of depositing county or state funds into multiple accounts, none exceeding the 
$20,000 limit, to ensure full protection. In addition, many states required that 
bonds be used to collateralize deposits, with requirements varying from one 
locality to the next. Donald P. Lindsay of the National League of Insured Sav- 
ings Associations described the task of the King County treasurer in Washing- 
ton State, who kept 552 S&L passbook accounts to ensure that county funds 
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ton State who mistakenly calculated the FSLIC coverage within one S&L and 
lost funds. The National Association of Mutual Savings Banks supported 100 
percent insurance of  government deposits, hoping for more business (U.S. 
House 1973). The vice president of  the Credit Union National Association, 
William D. Heier, supported the St. Germain bill. Since the Federal Credit 
Union Act prohibited federal credit unions from receiving funds from state and 
local governments, he proposed an amendment to allow credit unions to re- 
ceive such funds. 
While Willie favored higher individual coverage, he resisted full coverage 
for government deposits. The chairman of  the FDIC pointed out that public 
depositors’ losses had been very  small and they had recovered 99 percent of 
funds from failed banks. He was concerned that this innovation would imperil 
the insurance fund. An increase in coverage for all depositors to $50,000 would 
have caused the ratio of the insurance fund to insured deposits to fall from 1.28 
to 1.13 percent. Willie did not find this alarming, except when coupled with 
100 percent insurance for public units. The full coverage for public units would 
have driven the coverage of the insurance fund to 1.04 percent. At such a level, 
the fund might easily be exhausted if large banks continued to fail. In contrast, 
Thomas R. Bomar, head of  the FWLBB, was more sanguine and fully sup- 
ported the position of the thrift industry, testifying that the FSLIC fund would 
not  be  put at risk by  100 percent insurance of  government deposits (U.S. 
House 1973). 
In spite of the growing demands from many parts of the financial industry 
for more and more insurance, some sectors resisted. One official of the Ameri- 
can Bankers Association, H. Phelps Brooks, Jr., president of Peoples National 
Bank of Chester, South Carolina, made their case: “Full insurance coverage of 
public accounts will open the door to pressure for 100 percent insurance of all 
accounts.  Account holders with quasi-public  responsibility could well ask why 
their savings or checking accounts above $20,000 are any less important than 
Government funds. . . .  When the county sewer district promptly receives 100 
percent of its deposits upon closing of the institution, the officials at the local 
private hospital will certainly feel entitled to special consideration.  Then other 
depositories with large accounts would not understand why their accounts are 
not fully covered.”  Brooks concluded that  100 percent coverage would have 
detrimental effects on the sound management of depository institutions (U.S. 
House 1973, 114). 
Faced with these strongly held conflicting positions, Congress passed com- 
promise legislation in  1974. Insurance of  deposits for individuals and busi- 
nesses was  lifted to $40,000, while the government deposit guarantee was 
hiked to $100,000. This legislation applied to commercial banks, mutual sav- 
ings banks, and thrifts. SIPC protection was raised to $100,000 in cash and 
securities, with a $40,000 maximum for cash. The result was a dramatic rise 
in real protection as seen in the data for the FDIC. The real value of insurance 
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of  banks, except the very largest, as seen in table 3.2, achieved much higher 
rates of protection for their deposits and accounts. Five years of  legislation, 
beginning in  1970, had spread insurance to institutions beyond the banking 
system and dramatically raised the level of  insurance. Until the S&L crisis 
broke, a further increase in insurance appeared unlikely. 
3.7  $100,000 Insurance and “Too Big To Fail” 
The collapse of the S&L industry has been extensively chronicled (Barth 
1991; Kane 1989; White 1991). By the end of the 1970s, the income and net 
worth of the thrift industry was plummeting. Measured by book value, the net 
worth of the thrift industry fell from 5.5 to 0.5 percent of assets between 1977 
and  1982, but any market value method showed the industry as whole to be 
insolvent by  about $100 billion. The FSLIC possessed only $6.5  billion of 
reserves and could have paid off only a fraction of the deposits of  insolvent 
thrifts. The housing industry did not  want  massive  S&L closures, and the 
Reagan administration had no desire to see a doubling of the federal deficit. A 
militant S&L lobby pressured the FSLIC into a policy of forbearance-putting 
off any serious attempt to discipline or close thrifts. With generous PAC money, 
the thrifts also helped to persuade Congress to give them another chance to re- 
cover. 
The results of intense lobbying by the thrifts and other financial institutions 
were the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 (DIDMCA) and the Garn-St.  Germain Act of 1982. All financial institu- 
tions, banks and thrifts, began a phased eliminated of interest rate ceilings over 
the next six years. The 1982 act authorized banks and thrifts to offer money 
market deposit accounts to compete with money market mutual funds. Further- 
more, S&Ls were given a whole new  range of  powers. They were released 
from their traditional portfolio constraints and permitted to increase consumer 
loans, commercial real estate mortgages, and business loans. In addition to this 
legislation, the FHLBB diluted capital requirements. 
Congress did not openly discuss the issue of  deposit insurance. There was 
considerable opposition to  any further protection. Federal bank  regulators 
strongly opposed an increase in coverage, emphasizing that it would cause 
some institutions to take more risks. Instead, the increase in coverage was 
added quietly and quickly to DIDMCA in a House-Senate conference session 
to placate the thrifts, which feared the impact of  interest rate deregulation 
(Litan 1994). 
The 1980 act raised federal deposit insurance coverage for individual depos- 
its from $40,000 to $100,000 for banks, thrifts, and credit unions. Customer 
accounts with broker-dealers were now insured up to a maximum of $100,000 
in cash and $500,000 in both cash and securities. The result of this legislation 
was  a big increase in the real value of  insurance (fig. 3.1) to approximately 
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(fig. 3.2); and, as table 3.2 shows, the leap from $40,000 to $100,000 brought 
a much higher rate of protection for all classes of banks. 
Deposit insurance was locked firmly in place, yet since 1980, there has been 
no further increase in deposit insurance. As of  1996, it has been 16 years since 
there was any nominal increase in coverage. Unlike the end of two periods of 
similar length, 1934-50  and 1950-66,  there is no swelling demand for a new 
rise. The real value of insurance has declined with inflation, but it is still more 
than 50 percent higher than the 1934 level. Some constraints have been placed 
on insurance. There have been some additional limits placed on the coverage 
of accounts to limit the creation of joint and multiple accounts to expand cover- 
age.” Following the 1986 increase in the minimum capital ratio to 6 percent 
(White 1991), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 
1991 mandated the creation of risk-based insurance premiums in an attempt to 
control the problem of moral hazard. 
While the high real level of coverage may  have  reduced the demand for 
insurance, there are other important factors at work, most notably, the “too big 
to fail” policy providing de facto 100 percent insurance. Deposit insurance was 
a useful instrument for guaranteeing relatively small deposits. The advent of 
very  large  denomination, uninsured  certificates of  deposit  (CDs)  allowed 
banks greater ability to manage their liabilities. But it left them subject to the 
judgment of the money market. Rumors of insolvency panicked large CD hold- 
ers into a run on Continental Illinois in 1984. The Federal Reserve and the 
FDIC intervened to protect all depositors, large and small, because they feared 
that losses would precipitate runs on other banks, generating a systemwide 
crisis. The bailout of  Continental Illinois certified the too-big-to-fail policy 
that had been evoked in the early  1970s in the case of selected banks, like 
Franklin National (Sprague 1986). Although initially aimed at only the money 
center banks, the doctrine was extended in varying degrees to other big banks 
(Boyd and Gertler 1993). This subsidization of risk taking by large banks pro- 
duced an incentive to grow. When combined with the reduction in geographic 
barriers to branching and holding companies, a wave of mergers and acquisi- 
tions began in the 1980s. The winnowing of weak institutions in the bank and 
thrift crises of the decade and this consolidation of the banking industry has 
reduced the lobbies that previously pushed for higher coverage while leaving 
deposit insurance firmly in place. 
3.8  Conjecture and Conclusion 
In  the public’s eye, deposit insurance is still considered one of  the great 
successes of the New Deal. While many economists no longer hold it in such 
high regard, any serious rollback is politically inconceivable. Public accep- 
tance of deposit insurance for banks and thrifts, even with numerous costly 
17. See http://www.fdic.gov for the details of these restrictions. 117  The Legacy of Deposit Insurance 
failures, has enabled these intermediaries to obtain higher levels of real cover- 
age and made it easier for other institutions to press their claims for insuring 
their liabilities. A reasonable policy question is whether the cost of  deposit 
insurance exceeded the cost of bank failures in the absence of  deposit insur- 
ance, following the Great Depression. This counterfactual question is poten- 
tially complex, and I will only consider here the case with the available com- 
plete data for the FDIC. 
The New Deal greatly altered the structure of the financial system. The con- 
straints that were placed on banks allowed other intermediaries to capture what 
otherwise might have been banking business. Thus, the size of  the banking 
sector is smaller than it would have been in the absence of  the New  Deal. 
Similarly, the regulations on bank portfolios altered the liquidity and risk of 
banks, affecting the probability of  bank failure. Any attempt at constructing 
what the banking system would have looked like and how many failures would 
have occurred in the absence of the New Deal requires grand simplifying as- 
sumptions. Aware of these difficulties, I offer here a simple, suggestive count- 
erfactual where macroeconomic policy continued to be generally stabilizing 
after World War 11, preventing any new great depression. 
First, I estimated the real cost of bank losses under the FDIC from 1945 to 
1994. The cost here is taken to be the administrative and operating expenses 
of the FDIC plus the losses from bank failures. To estimate the latter, I consid- 
ered the losses from the three types of  FDIC interventions: deposit payoffs, 
deposit assumptions, and assistance transactions. For payoffs, I took the esti- 
mated losses (disbursements less recoveries) plus the deposits not reimbursed 
by  the FDIC (estimated by  the total deposits times the fraction of uninsured 
deposits).18  For assumptions and assistance transactions, the estimated losses 
to the FDIC were used. The total losses for each year were converted into real 
dollars, employing the consumer price index with  1982-84  as base year. As 
presented in table 3.6, the total cost of resolving bank failures with the FDIC 
was $39 billion for 1945-94,  or an annual cost of $770 million. The present 
discounted value of the cost of bank failures from the beginning of the postwar 
era, 1945, was $7.8 billion. This starting date was selected to omit the chaos 
and cleanup of the 1930s. 
What the bank failures would have looked like in the absence of the New 
Deal is difficult to estimate. Banking and Monetary Statistics (Board of Gover- 
nors 1943)  reported the estimated losses to depositors for all bank failures from 
1921 to 1941. The average annual loss rate on total bank deposits for 1921-28, 
the nearest period of  stability without insurance, was 0.1032 percent. If  we 
assume that the structure of the banking system after 1945  remained essentially 
the same as it was in the 1920s and the shocks to the economy were the same, 
then we could use the loss rate to estimate the losses to depositors in the ab- 
18. Data on losses to customers whose accounts were over the maximum level of coverage were 
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Table 3.6  Cost of FDIC Insurance and Counterfactual Deposit Losses, 1945-94 
(billion 1982-84 dollars) 
Assumption 
Under the FDIC 
No FDIC 
Loss rates of  1921-28 





Estimated  Recovery Rates (%) 
cost 
AAClPDV  80  65  50  48 
.7717.8 
.96/12.8 
,1412  ,2414  ,6616  ,68116 
,2615  ,4619  .66/12  ,68113 
.52/10  ,92117  1.32124  1.38125 
.74114  1.08124  1.86134  1.94136 
Note: Table reports estimated cost of bank failures. Entries list average annual cost (AAC)/present 
discounted value (PDV). 
sence of the FDIC. Multiplying the loss rate times the real deposits of insured 
banks for each year of  1945-94 yields a potential annual loss of $960 million, 
or a present discounted value of  $12.8 billion. There is also reason to think 
that estimate is high because the banking system was undergoing a shakeout 
in the 1920s, as many small banks were disappearing. The Great Depression 
accelerated this process and eliminated virtually any bank showing signs of 
weakness. The recession of  1936-37  would have further winnowed the bank- 
ing system. Furthermore, the New Deal halted the process of merger and con- 
solidation that had started in the 1920s. This development would certainly have 
continued more vigorously in the post-World  War I1 period in the absence of 
New  Deal banking regulation. Both the destruction of weak banks and the 
formation of larger banks would have produced a stronger banking system with 
fewer losses. 
An alternative approach to estimating the losses to depositors in the absence 
of the FDIC is to use varying bank failure rates and recovery rates. The ratio 
of deposits in suspending banks to total deposits for the period 1921-28  was 
0.29 1 percent. For a slightly longer period (1907-29)  and for national banks 
only, it was 0.283. Table 3.6 offers four possible failure rates. Beginning in 
1907, the comptroller of the currency (U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, van- 
ous years; and see Calomiris and White 1994) produced detailed records of 
recoveries and losses for national banks. No single detailed source exists for 
state-chartered banks. The recovery rates used  are percentages paid out on 
proved claims three years after suspension. After three years, recoveries are 
very low. The average recovery rate for suspended national banks from 1907 
to  1927, weighted by bank deposits, was 48 percent.19 The recovery rate for 
the FDIC on its disbursements for failed banks from 1934 to  1994 was  65 
19. If the rates are weighted by  the number of banks, the average rate is 42 percent. I stop in 
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percent (FDIC, Annual Report  1994). Whether the FDIC was  more efficient 
than the receivers under the national banking system or whether the nature of 
the failures or economic conditions were different is difficult to determine. 
Rather than hazard a guess, table 3.6 offers several recovery rates, ranging 
from 48 to 80 percent and including the FDIC and national bank suspension 
rates. 
Table 3.6 provides a range of counterfactual estimates. If  banks in the post- 
1945 period continued to fail at the same rate as national banks had in 1921-27 
and had the same low recovery rate, depositors might have been hit with losses 
of $1.86 billion per year, much more than under the FDIC. However, this esti- 
mate is certainly an upper bound. If failure rates were lower and recovery rates 
were higher-both  plausible assumptions with a stronger banking system- 
then costs to depositors would have been similar or even lower than under the 
FDIC. For a broad range of estimates, it appears that the FDIC did not reduce 
costs and may have raised them. Unfortunately, given the absence of compara- 
ble data, it was not possible to conduct this exercise for the FSLIC. However, 
the sheer magnitude of the S&L disaster of the 1980s relative to the calm of 
the 1920s strongly suggests that the FSLIC imposed very high costs compared 
to an uninsured system. 
Even given the tenuous nature of  these estimates, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that deposit insurance did not substantially reduce aggregate losses 
from bank failures and may have raised them. What it did do was to alter the 
distribution of  losses. Instead of a small number of  depositors bearing the 
losses of a relatively small number of banks, costs were distributed to all de- 
positors and hidden in the premia levied on banks. While these costs remained 
large in aggregate, they appeared to have vanished to the individual depositor. 
The new distribution of the costs of failure made the FDIC a widely accepted 
program and has ensured the continuance of deposit insurance into the next 
century. 
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